Democracy Takes Root

14:57 Yerevan | 10:57 GMT | Friday 29 February 2008

Sergey Markedonov

The year 2008 can be called an “Election Year” for Southern Caucasus states. On Jan. 5, there was a presidential election in Georgia (with a parliamentary election campaign coming up in May). It was Armenia’s turn on February 19. A few days ago, this republic not only elected its president, it practically completed an election cycle. In May 2007, Armenia elected its national parliament. That was when Serge Sarkisyan, the winning party’s frontrunner and Prime Minister of Armenia, became the official successor of Robert Kocharyan.

After processing voting records from all 1923 polling stations, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Armenia announced the results. According to its data, Sarkisyan received 53 percent. The second place was taken by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the first president of Armenia (1991-1998). Ter-Petrosyan received 21.5 percent, followed by the Armenian parliament’s ex-speaker Arthur Bagdarasyan at 17 percent, the representative of Armenia’s oldest party Dashnaktsutiun and vice-speaker of the republic’s current parliament Vaan Ovannisyan with 6 percent, and former prime minister of Armenia’s government in the early 1990’s Vazgen Manukyan with 2 percent. Turnout was high, at nearly 70 percent.

However, election results in Armenia cannot be measured purely with electoral arithmetic. Up until now, the Southern Caucasus region had no experience in transferring power from one leader to another through electoral procedures, and Armenia did not have an established tradition of succession of power. Levon Ter-Petrosyan won the election in 1996, but his victory was questioned not only via mass demonstrations, but also by a declaration of the state of emergency following the election. In 1998 he resigned as a result of a “velvet coup.” During the 2003 parliamentary and presidential elections, there were new protests and questions of the regime’s legitimacy.

Some of these elements are present today as well, as followers of the defeated candidate likewise go out into the street to protest. But there are also new aspects. Having served two terms in office, Robert Kocharyan leaves without violating the Fundamental Law. Serge Sarkisyan won in a competitive election. He certainly is the successor to Kocharyan’s political course, but his victory is derived from an election procedure, rather than a coup or a series of behind-the-scenes negotiations. Thus, a new precedent is being set for a politically unstable region.

The results of Armenian elections were not known beforehand, and the intrigue persevered through election day. In September 2007, Levon Ter-Petrosyan returned to politics after nine years of silence and absence from any public activities.

This bright politician, who once led Armenia to independence, won two election campaigns and lost his third one. He didn’t fail completely, as his opponents and propagandists will make it sound both in Yerevan and in Moscow. Armenia’s former president has great electoral potential, unlike his main opponent, Ter-Petrosyan who had no administrative resources and no party structures at his disposal. He did not have his own faction in the parliament, although he did have sympathizers among its members. But he did face pressure and informational warfare. He was accused of everything short of intentionally starving his own people. Less than six months later and in the conditions described above, the ex-president won almost one-fourth of all votes.

As is usually the case in post-Soviet states, the announcement of election campaign results is interpreted in many different ways, sometimes spilling out into the capital’s streets. Here is how David Petrosyan, a well-known Yerevan journalist and political analyst describes the new 2008 trend of street protests: “Meetings, processions and other protest actions attract dozens of thousands of people. The regime does everything in its power to not allow followers of L. Ter-Petrosyan to flow into the capital from the provinces. So far Ter-Petrosyan’s followers have demonstrated composure, self-control and good organization. Despite the fact that they do not accept the results of the election and call the current events a “criminal coup.” So far the opposition is practicing peaceful, non-violent legal and political methods. And this is probably the course this struggle will continue to take.”

It is hard to argue with Petrosyan’s words. However, the opposition’s adherence to purely “peaceful methods of struggle” can also be ascribed to their understanding of the other resources the regime possesses besides coercion. It has its own popularity resource, which can be relied upon to use administrative pressure and informational “pumping.”

If the current regime had no authority among the population, the opposition would probably have acted in a more forceful and less peaceful way. But the ghost of Orange Revolutions, which some excessively zealous propagandists scared the Russian public with, has yet to take root in Armenia. As Azerbaijan’s militarist rhetoric increases, any internal destabilization in Armenia could potentially threaten the country’s security.

The Armenian opposition as a whole, just like the Georgian one, has not been able to become fully consolidated or to produce a clear program and platform. The Armenian opposition was unable to increase its electoral support by enlisting uncertain voters. The slogans of stability and predictability have yet again turned out to be more important for the majority of the population.

But based on election results (not only on the vote count, but also on the facts of intra-political dynamics as a whole), it can be concluded that, first of all, these elections were a competitive struggle. There was no “Operation Successor” that would have gone smoothly and predictably.

Secondly, the competition will most likely continue, judged by the situation inside the Central Election Commission. In particular, two of the eight CEC members refused to sign the election report, and one member appended his signature but expressed a “special opinion.”

Now, much will depend on Ter-Petrosyan’s plans. Will he become a magnet for all discontented Armenians, a patriarch of the opposition? The next parliamentary election is a long three years away. Unlike their Georgian colleagues, the Armenian opposition has to develop a long-term strategy. In these three years, they will have to accrue political weight. That is, they must not attempt to get rid of each other, and should not criticize authorities just for being in power. This task is much more complicated than simply holding protests and rallies.

As for the “West-Russia” dilemma, no matter what his policy is, the president of Armenia will solve it along the following lines: both the West and Russia. In Yerevan this course is called a policy of complimentarism.

The Armenian elite will cooperate with Moscow as well as with Washington and with Brussels, for rather pragmatic reasons. There are abundant Armenian diasporas in Western countries (especially in the United States and France), which are involved in both business activities and in the administrative and political decision-making process in these countries. Also, Armenia is trying to influence Turkey (Ankara wants to join the EU, and therefore must adjust to “European standards”), as well as to overcome its far from brilliant isolation with Western help. All this means that no matter who wins in Yerevan, these “winners” will be guided not by pretty toasts, but by real politics, advantages and pragmatism.

Russia likewise needs to be pragmatic in developing its strategy in the Caucasus. Our country should switch from references to the “glorious past” to pragmatic advantages. Armenia is ready and willing to cooperate with Russia in the military sphere, as well as in the field of security (unlike Georgia).

This opportunity should be taken advantage of, along with other opportunities. Not many people know that the gasification in Armenia is developing much faster than inside Russia itself.

Russian business is also very active in the field of telecommunications, having invested more in this field in one year than Greek business has in the past ten. These are the interests that should become grounds for full-value bilateral cooperation between Armenia and Russia, and not fear of the Western threat and “colored revolutions.”

Sergey Markedonov, PhD, is the Head of the Interethnic Relations Department at Moscow’s Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

Monday, 6 September 2010

Democracy Takes Root

14:57 Yerevan | 10:57 GMT | Friday 29 February 2008

Sergey Markedonov

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